1-1-1963

The politics of peace

Gerald Bailey

55

THE POLITICS OF PEACE

The Lilly Lectures in Religion

by

Gerald Bailey

THE POLITICS OF PEACE

The Lilly Lectures in Religion

by

Gerald Bailey

THE EARLHAM COLLEGE PRESS

Richmond, Indiana

THE POLITICS OF PEACE

The Lilly Lectures in Religion

by

Gerald Bailey

THE EARLHAM COLLEGE PRESS

Richmond, Indiana

THE POLITICS OF PEACE

The Lilly Lectures in Religion

by

Gerald Bailey

THE EARLHAM COLLEGE PRESS

Richmond, Indiana

FOREWORD

Because Gerald Bailey's lectures, given at Earlham College soon after the climactic days of the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962, were so illuminating to those privileged to hear them, Earlham College is now making them available to the reading public. Gerald Bailey is a distinguished British Quaker who has served long on the East-West Committee of London Yearly Meeting of Friends and has represented Friends on many occasions as a part of the non-governmental group at the Assembly of the United Nations. Gerald Bailey has visited mainland China since the establishment of the Communist government and has been, many times, in the Soviet Union. He is, perhaps, the most widely travelled Friend of our generation.

Landrum R. Bolling
President
Earlham College

The lectures reproduced here were delivered at Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, in November 1962. They had been largely prepared four months earlier but two weeks before they were delivered the East-West crisis over Cuba arose and it was necessary to insert references to these events and their implications. These revisions were made in the immediate aftermath of the crisis but I have found no reason to change them materially and, in fact, have left them substantially as they were spoken. I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to the President and faculty of Earlham for the invitation to give these talks in the series of Lilly Lectures on Religion and Politics and for the great pleasure and stimulus I derived from my visit.

G. B.

January, 1963.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1

THE PROPHET AND THE RECONCILER

I want to think aloud for a short time this morning on an aspect of the age-long problem of religion and politics, or, to be more precise, on the interplay of the relative and the ideal in the field of international politics and international peace-making. And since basically the subject is as old as politics if not as old as religion, and certainly as old as the Society of Friends, I shall not attempt to discuss it at the historical and philosophical levels where I would have little that is new or pertinent to say. Setting my sights much more modestly, I propose to relate the question quite strictly to our present situation and to some of the predicaments which confront those who desire to make a reality of their religious confessions and convictions in the contemporary world. I also want to relate the question to a debate, if debate is the right word in this case, which has been going on intermittently over the last year or two within the Quaker movement in my own country, that is in the London Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends. Though the terms are only partially appropriate, the issue has become crystallized there under the title *The Prophet and the Reconciler,* and the essential question it raises is: what happens to our perfectionist ideals, our absolute and uncompromising standards when they are brought down into the dusty, even dirty, arena of politics and power, of government and the implications of government; when they are brought face to face, that is, not with things as we would have them be but with things as they are? Must we take our perfectionist ethics, our absolute aims and ideals into the inevitably relative power situations with which international politics must deal? And if we do so take them, should we expect to maintain them unsullied and uncompromised in the process? Furthermore, can we set the limits of compromise just where it suits us to set them? Can we be, as it were, in and out of the political business of peace-making? Can we be prophet and reconciler at one and the same time?

So far, I must say, the articulate and authoritative voices in my own Yearly Meeting have given an affirmative answer to this last question. W. Grigor McClelland, speaking to the Yearly Meeting of 1960 in London, not only rejected any insoluble contradiction between the two roles but saw them as necessarily and desirably fused in the

spirit and the action of each and every person committed to a Christian profession of peace. The prophet, as McClelland defines him, "devotes himself to preaching the unilateral abandonment of arms as a moral duty. He is engaged on a crusade to bring to his fellowmen a consciousness that war is wrong. He calls them whether as humble citizens or as national leaders to cast away all arms, come what may." The reconciler, on the other hand, "devotes himself to working for the establishment of conditions in which people will feel no need to rely upon arms because they do not feel threatened. He seeks to relax tensions, to promote meetings of persons and meetings of minds, to suggest acceptable solutions for divisive problems." "We are tempted to assert," McClelland continues, "that between these two extremes, the one claiming to be realist, the other to be moral, there can be no halfway house that is not the product either of confusion or of opportunism. This is to make a grave mistake." And a little later concluding his lecture, he says, "The truth is that we are all called to both vocations, that of the prophet and that of the reconciler, neither of them as an end in itself but both as a by-product of Christian inspirations and Christian living."

Delivering under the title *Building the Institutions of Peace,* the annual Swarthmore Lecture, prior to the Yearly Meeting of 1962, yet another colleague of mine, Duncan Wood, reached, if in somewhat vaguer and more cautious terms, a not dissimilar conclusion. "The message we have to deliver," he said in a concluding chapter, "both to the world and to the rulers of it has its temporal and eternal aspects. Most of the topics that we have considered so far belong to the realm of time." He was referring here, let me interpolate, to his own discussion of the problems and possibilities of the United Nations and of the implications of the East-West and North-South problems. And he added: "These temporal problems may seem remote from the historic peace testimony of the Society of Friends which belongs to the realm of eternity. This is not so. Who can tell to what extent man's undoubted progress towards international peace is due to the prophetic message that such peace is possible? Is it not conceivable that without the intervention of foolish prophets, the wise world might now be rushing to destruction like lemmings in a year of abundance unaware of any alternative destination?" "The peace testimony," he adds, "will continue to give meaning and inspiration to our message for today and it loses none of its validity, if to the uncompromising negative of our re-

fusal to bear arms, we add a demand for a positive commitment to the international ideal."

There are two assumptions here, incidentally, which I find unwarranted, namely that only the prophets believe peace to be possible and that if it was not for the prophets and the pacifists we should have destroyed ourselves by this time in global thermo-nuclear war. But the core of the matter is whether, as I shall ask in a moment, "the uncompromising negative of the refusal to bear arms"—a symbolic term by the way these days—is, in fact, "compatible with a positive commitment to the international idea," if this last is to involve more than a vague preference for internationalism and peace. However, before I join in the discussion myself, let me emphasize that there is no dispute as to the validity of *both* the roles of prophet and of reconciler. Nor is there any question, at least in my own mind, that the world has need of both, has room and need of both the prophetic and the reconciling tasks. Either from a point of detachment outside or maybe from within the arena itself, we can prophetically proclaim the message of total pacifism — of integral peace — the message as the beloved Canon Sheppard in England used to define it, not of "peace at any price but love at all costs." Recognizing with a Quaker statement issued in the year of the Battle of Trafalgar — in 1805, that is — that "it is an awful thing to stand forth to the nation as the advocate of an inviolable peace," we *can* so stand forth according to the faith and the vision and the courage we possess. We can opt for total military defenselessness for ourselves and our nation. We can repudiate as an inflexible principle all reliance on military force or military pressure whether for "deterrence" or for use. We can reject all use of coercive power in international relations and opt for the exclusive dependence on non-violent resistance and moral suasion that total pacifism demands. We can resolutely refuse to surrender any part or portion of the ideal for which we stand. We can do this despite the possible consequences, for ourselves anyway, if we have, I would say, honestly and fearlessly faced them. "Here stand I," we can say, "I can do no other."

On the other hand we can equally well and equally honourably be reconcilers in the sense that the term is here used. We can busy ourselves, as indeed I have been doing in the last few weeks in New York, with Duncan Wood's "temporal problems." We can wrestle with the day-to-day

issues in international relations set out in the agendas of the United Nations. We can seek to harmonize the conflicting aims of nations, to reduce tensions whether between East and West or North and South. We can involve ourselves in the highly complex questions of applied and agreed disarmament. We can face, that is to say, the precise tasks the governments and the statesmen have to face and share with them in some degree the hopes and fears, the accommodations and the compromises involved. And looking objectively at these roles we can not only vindicate and justify both but agree, too, that each has need of the other. "The relativist," says Frederick Tolles in his Ward Lecture *Quakerism and Politics,* "needs the absolutist to keep alive and clear the vision of God while he struggles in some measure to realize it in the City of Earth. And conversely, the absolutist needs the relativist lest the vision remain the possession of a few only — untranslated into any degree of reality for the world as a whole."

The roles then, we can agree, are complementary. But if we choose to be reconcilers, if we choose to concern ourselves with the temporal problems, to spend our time and energy wrestling with practical international issues and involving ourselves necessarily therefore in the business of statesmanship and statecraft, then it seems clear to me we must face the implications of the choice. We must face, frankly, the nature of government and of politics and the responsibilities and limitations that go with them. We must acknowledge that there are, in fact, no short cuts to the avoidance of war and the assurance of peace, that there are indeed no simple and clear-cut solutions to many if not all, the major international problems of our time. I believe it was Alfred North Whitehead who said, "In public affairs the simple solutions are invariably the wrong solutions." Indeed we have to recognize that some practical questions in the international field are simply not solvable within given circumstances or within given time. They are not, in fact, problems at all in the sense that they have discoverable solutions in the mathematical sense. I remember a wise Englishman, Nathaniel Micklem, pointing out in an essay on politics and religion that there is no ready-to-hand solution, for example, of the Arab-Israeli tension, for it is an estrangement not an intellectual puzzle. "We may say," he adds, "if we think it useful, that if only Arabs and Jews would all become Christians or Buddhists or would accept the ideas and the ideals of Thomas Arnold of Rugby, their difficulties and dissensions would disappear.

So, no doubt they would; but as politicians we must deal with people who are neither Christians nor Buddhists, and very rarely wear old school ties."

We have to go further than this, however, I suggest, and recognize that the responsibility of individual persons must not be confused and cannot simply be identified with the collective responsibility of the nation and of the statesmen who lead it. There can be martyr individuals certainly but not a martyr nation — a nation accepting martyrdom voluntarily, that is, except in the virtually impossible circumstance that all the people or at least a great majority of them, have freely and fully accepted the implications of martyrdom and want to endure them. "Nations made up of unregenerate persons cannot," as Vernon Holloway put it, "act like a community of love." Or to put it another way: there may be no insoluble dilemmas for the individual. There may be no enforced choice of evils, no enforced choice of the less than ideal for him, since he can claim that God will always show him a better way though not necessarily an easier one. But the nation is not similarly placed. It cannot escape the relativity of history nor the political choices within history, nor can the statesmen accept the responsibility for the consequences of the decisions they take in its name. Nor, if we move into the realm of political and practical peace-making can we overlook the nature of the nation-state system itself which, pending the realization of a fully-organized world community, is the inescapable framework of international relations in which we have to operate. We cannot in these circumstances escape from the considerations of power or the calculations of power any more than can the state itself or the statesmen. We cannot just wish the element of power, and therefore of coercion, out of existence. To do so, or to attempt to do so, is not to be uncompromised; it is to nullify ourselves in the very process in which we are engaged.

Now we have had perhaps a graphic, a dramatic illustration of this problem in the events of these last days. I do not want to involve myself here and now in political judgements as to the rightness or inevitability of the action the President of the United States took a short time ago in respect to the newly discovered build-up of Soviet offensive military power in Cuba. I think future events, future history may well confirm that this was an epoch-making action, a turning-point in history, in which the Soviet Union and the United States got off, as it were, the collision

course on which they were travelling and at the same time made possible, perhaps for the first time, a realistic and practical and productive approach to a solution of the issues that divide them. This hope will not, of course, materialize unless there is a sustained will to make it materialize on both sides; a sustained readiness to reach firm and honourable agreements and above all to reduce and eventually eliminate the — as we have seen — deadly peril of a nuclear arms race. But the point is that this reinforcement, as I think it may prove to be, of the hopes of peace has resulted essentially from the willingness of the United States — let us be quite blunt about this — to go not merely up to but beyond the point that might have loosed a thermo-nuclear disaster on the world. It was not enough to go up to the brink with the declared or undeclared intention of withdrawing in face of a threat of counter-force. The bluff, if bluff it was, would have been called. It was necessary, in brief, to risk war for the sake of peace and the refusal to do so might well, in the circumstances as they are, have made war sooner or later inevitable. The prophet — the integral pacifist — and indeed the reconciler too, can and must insist that the deployment of military power or the threat of war, while it may postpone or prevent war, cannot of itself or without much else, remove our perils and guarantee our peace. But he cannot claim or affirm that in the desperate choices the President had to make, there was any course open to him that was risk-free, or ideal, or that given the circumstances the choice made was not, for the President, inescapable and right.

The issue is presented scarcely less acutely if one turns to the two related purposes in which incidentally both prophet and reconciler have equal concern — the related tasks of achieving total national disarmament and establishing some kind of world system of security and peace. Negotiation of an arms treaty, however prolonged and difficult, remains the only practical route to a disarmed world. It involves essentially, however, the maintenance of an approximate parity of military power between the parties at all stages of the process from the first reduction to the final achievement of complete disarmament. Any substantial unilateral disarmament on the part of any of the major parties to a disarmament discussion would destroy in all probability or indefinitely postpone, the hopes of an agreed and negotiated disarmament treaty. We can advocate, therefore, or pursue one policy or the other — **total** unilateral disarmament or multilateral dis-

armament by agreement. We cannot, I believe, pursue both policies at the same time. And is there any doubt that the way to the complete disarmament of the nation-state and the elimination of the arbitrary exercise of power by the single nation, is in the pooling of power in the hands of an acceptable international authority? Can this, too, be reconciled with the requirements of a total and unequivocal non-reliance upon force — an unswerving and unqualified adherence to the way of love and of peaceful persuasion?

Faced with these questions and the necessity to answer them, I have come reluctantly and not without much exercise of spirit, to the conclusion that for my part anyway and in the light of the vision I possess at present, I cannot claim to be at one and the same time prophet and reconciler in any adequate and meaningful interpretation of these terms. I have come to doubt whether, to put it colloquially, we can have it both ways. It seems to me manifest that once by our own deliberate choice we have committed our ideals — our absolutist and perfectionist ideals — to the demands of the political scene, to what Rufus Jones once called "the tender mercies of a world not yet ripe for them," we cannot by the same token pretend or insist that they be maintained unchanged or unimpaired. Once so submitted they become affected inexorably by the conditions governing political action and political change in the international sphere — unless we are to say, surely indefensibly, that these conditions are for the statesman or for the government, but not for us. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we cannot. I have reached this conclusion, I repeat, with not a little travail of spirit, recognizing that the implications are deep and far-reaching and that they face me with dilemmas hardly less acute than those I claim to have resolved. It is in any case a personal decision which I cannot and would not wish to impose on any who are listening to me. Certainly the last thing I would want to do is to discourage anyone here of assuming the role of the prophet if he or she has the urge and the determination and the courage to do so. But I beg you not to minimize the role. I beg you to recognize that the prophetic role makes tremendous, if not total, claims upon you; that it claims the obligation to set all human relations, not merely the issue of peace and war, on the basis of sacrificial love. "It is not consistent for anyone," said an English Quaker Conference of 1920, "to claim that his Christianity as a way of life stops him from war unless he is prepared to adjust his

entire life, in its personal aspirations, in its relations with his fellows, in its pursuit of truth, in its economic and social bearings, in its political obligations, in its religious fellowships, in its intercourse with God, to the tremendous demands of God's way."

This is indeed a pretentious vocation, perhaps the greatest and noblest of all. Go to it if you must and can! But if, on the other hand, you opt for the role of the reconciler, if you decide to enter the arena of international political action, do not, I beg you, be apologetic despite the inconsistencies and compromises in which you will be involved. Do not presume that it will not present moral challenges too. Do not presume that the approach based on religious realism, for which I am appealing, makes the task any less a moral task. In the same lecture from which I quoted earlier, Frederick Tolles has this to say of the 18th century Quaker rulers of Pennsylvania: "In some degree everyone of them had come to terms with the world, had compromised the purity of his religious testimony as a Quaker. But they had created in the American wilderness a commonwealth in which civil and religious liberty, social and political equality, domestic and external peace had reigned to a degree and for a length of time unexampled in the history of the Western world." If in God's good time and with God's help the reconcilers can create, in the wilderness which is our world today, a world-wide commonwealth in which these same values and conditions prevail, they will have little or nothing for which to apologize.

Chapter 2

THIS SIDE IDOLATRY

Since I shall have a good deal to say in these remarks about the complaints and criticisms currently levelled against the United Nations in my own country and in the United States, I would begin with a simple statement of my own *credo* in respect of the world organization. For me a sufficient justification for the United Nations is the fact that — to quote the oft-used phrase — if the United Nations did not exist it would be indispensable to create it. It is obvious, it seems to me, that we cannot get along without disaster in the growingly interdependent world of today without some form of universally-based and universally-composed international organization harmonizing or attempting to harmonize the actions of all the nations and mitigating the conflicts which today could destroy our world. Leaving aside the positive achievements of the United Nations in the social and humanitarian fields — though these, too, would be sufficient justification for many of us — it is only necessary to consider what might have occurred if there had been no United Nations available to step into the anarchic situation in the Congo in the summer of 1960 or in the acutely grave situation which arose over Cuba a short time ago and in some degree still remains. Writing about the United Nations and its indispensability some few months ago, the American permanent delegate to the United Nations said: "We cannot undo the world which science is making over to us. With or without an embryonic instrument of international order, the overwhelming need for order remains. It is written into our conquest of space, our instant communication, our common neighbourhood of potential atomic death." We were only too keenly aware of the common neighbourhood of potential atomic death two weeks ago. We are not entitled to claim that the United Nations alone then saved the peace. But there is no question that the United Nations played an invaluable role in focussing the world-wide demand for a peaceful but honourable solution of the problem, in helping the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to withdraw from the edge of disaster and at least opening the way for the peaceful resolution of the points at issue. Now perhaps with greater conviction and feeling than ever, we can say: if we had no United Nations it would be necessary to invent one.

But that does not mean that the United Nations is all

gain and no loss; that it does not register failures as well as achievements. It does not mean that the United Nations is above criticism. Above all it does not mean that the United Nations is guaranteed immortality; that it does not face dangers that could be mortal to it in certain circumstances. It could suffer almost as much, I would suspect, from its avowed friends as from its avowed enemies — from those, that is to say, who judging it incapable of error are blind to its weaknesses and above all to the real problems which confront it. "This side idolatry" is therefore, I suggest, the right stance for the true supporter of the United Nations even at this moment when its reputation is high, and "this side idolatry" will be what I have to say about it.

The complaints widely expressed against the United Nations in the countries of the West — notably by Senator Fulbright in the United States and by Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, in my own country — can be broadly summarized as follows. The countries and governments newly acceded to the United Nations — in the main the succession States of Asia and Africa — have, it is alleged, frequently if not invariably maintained a double-standard in their attitude to the major powers of East and West. They have turned a blind eye to Soviet imperialism and to Communist influence and pressure in general, while maintaining a dangerously extreme and irrational opposition to the traditional colonial powers (even when these nations have been hastening to divest themselves of their colonialism and have been doing their utmost in the meantime to promote economic and political reforms in the areas concerned). In their obsession with Western colonialism, the Afro-Asian majority in the United Nations is using its newfound dominance, it is argued, to intervene recklessly in every so-called colonial situation, to distract the organization from its major purpose under the Charter of insuring international peace and security. In the process they are impairing the vital role of the United Nations as mediator and conciliator and generally tending to bring disrepute and impotence upon the whole organization. Moreover a situation is being created, it is said, in which power is being divested from responsibility, since by and large the Afro-Asian majority is incapable of meeting the growing financial necessities of the United Nations, the burden of which falls overwhelmingly on the larger states. To this there has to be added the more substantial, and perhaps more respectable, apprehension provoked not by the behaviour of

the newer states but by the record of United Nations' intervention in the Congo. This is the apprehension, felt perticularly perhaps in the countries of Western Europe — and shared, I imagine, to some extent by all of us — that the United Nations is being required prematurely to shoulder responsibilities beyond its resources and in the process to become involved in tasks which exceed its mandate and imperil its existence.

These are weighty charges and they have to be frankly faced, however unwarranted or exaggerated we may judge them to be. But before looking at them it may be useful to stress the extent of the changes within the United Nations which have given rise to these complaints. There were 51 founding-states of the United Nations in 1945. By 1950, the figure was only 60 whereas to-day—12 years later—the tally is 110 member-nations out of, I suppose, an immediately possible 115 or thereabouts. Most of the increase of 59 states since 1945 has come in fact since 1955 when the first so-called "package deal" on the admission of new members went through. And the increase, of course, is mainly in the representation of the new or newer states of Asia and Africa. In 1945, of the 51 members of the United Nations, 36 came from Europe and the Americas — North and South — and only 13 came from Africa, the Middle East and Asia. To-day of the 110 members of the organization, some 55—that is half — are from the African or Asian continents. And correspondingly the percentage of the total membership covered by the Americas and Western Europe has declined from almost 70 per cent in 1945 to 46 per cent to-day, and, of course, that 46 per cent includes a considerable bloc of Latin-American states.

This change in the composition of the United Nations over the last seven years appears even more striking if one makes a comparison between the United Nations and the old League of Nations. Among the 54 members of the League of Nations there were only six that would have been called Afro-Asian today. The United States did not belong. The majority was firmly derived from Europe and the British Commonwealth. All or most of the leading figures in the League were European — Briand, Streseman, Cecil, Benes, Politis, Titulesco and the rest. The Assembly was, in fact, a European body, reflecting pre-eminently the cultural experience and traditions of Europe. As H. G. Nicholas has put it, a trifle cynically: "It was European, it was Genevan; it was close, even cosy. It was as foreign as was compatible with being international."

I am not offering this as a necessarily derogatory comparison, derogatory that is to the United Nations as we know it today. It would be arrogant and absurd to suggest that Europe — with or without the Americas — had or has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue. And one can say that, while regretting, as I do, the decline of European influence in the United Nations. The fact is that the centres of world influence have been steadily moving since 1922 from Europe to the extremities of East and West, or, looked at another way, have begun, at least, to move from North to South and it is appropriate and inevitable that the United Nations should reflect these changes. Not only that; the Wilsonian principle of self-determination which brought a number of new succession States into the League of Nations after the first World War was exclusively European in its application. It was not intended to apply to the colonies and empires of the then great powers. The dependent countries of Asia and Africa had to wait for their independence until the aftermath of the Second World War. None of them is more than 16 years old as an independent entity; many of them are much newer than that. And sovereignty being what it is — and membership of the United Nations being as it were a hallmark of sovereignty — it is proper and inevitable that these new succession States should be in the United Nations and that that body should increasingly reflect their presence and their influence, whether for good or for ill.

Faced then with this decisive shift in the balance of forces within the United Nations, and accepting it as inevitable, what are we to say about its consequences for the life and future of the organization itself? Is it, in fact, true that the power now vested in the new succession States — which is largely, in fact, a voting power — is being exercised without responsibility or at least with insufficient responsibility in moral and political terms? Is it true that the anti-colonialist obsessions of the newly-independent States of Asia and Africa, are rendering them incapable of making a balanced and responsible assessment of issues confronting the United Nations — not least those that involve the relationships of the great powers of East and West? And is it, in fact, correct to say that these reflect serious and significant weaknesses in the United Nations which urgently need to be remedied?

There is certainly some substance in these charges, and their implications for the future authority as well as

the present usefulness of the United Nations are not to be under-rated. It is undeniable that in certain situations the Afro-Asian states, perhaps particularly the new African states, have at times allowed their obsessive anti-colonialism to distort their judgments and lead them into acts of discrimination and irresponsibility which must weaken the constructive influence of the United Nations and could ultimately therefore threaten their own proper interests and aspirations. Even if one now forgets their equivocal attitude over Hungary six years ago, how else can one characterize — whatever the merits of the Indian case — except as discriminatory, the totally uncritical connivance of most of the Afro-Asian delegations in the undoubted breach of the Charter involved in Mr. Nehru's military attack on Goa? How else can one characterize the attitude of the Afro-Asian group in respect of the situation in Southern Rhodesia at the special General Assembly of last summer in arbitrarily amending the rules of procedure of the Assembly and in supporting measures which could only hinder an agreed and peaceful solution of the problem, if not positively encourage the risk of violence and bloodshed in yet another African area? Or to take a third example, how else can one characterize the virtually total indifference on the part of the newer States to the restraints upon personal and political freedom in Ghana side by side with vehement and constant repudiation of *apartheid* in South Africa? There are other cases and similar instances which could be cited where some of the newly-independent States within the United Nations have displayed rather less than adequate responsibility in discharging their functions within the organization.

It is essential therefore not to ignore these aberrations nor to minimize their importance. The Afro-Asians, after all, are rapidly becoming the dominant group in the Assembly; the veto, it is sometimes said, is passing from the hands of the great powers into their hands and the future of the organization must depend in a very real sense on their capacity to exercise their position with discretion and impartiality. The dangers must not be minimized, therefore, but they need not be exaggerated either. The outlook may be more promising in this respect and the record, in fact, less disturbing than Western critics have been prepared to allow. Anti-colonialism, as understood in this context is, we may hope, a dying issue anyway. There will soon be no colonialism left outside the Communist world. When that time comes — and it is coming rapidly — the newer States

must chastise the former colonial powers, if they wish to chastise them at all, with other scorpions. One may hope, indeed, that then they and their former masters will be able to confront together the multifarious international problems that lie on the other side of colonialism; beyond that is the liquidation of the last remnants of the old European empires.

Meanwhile, whatever their aberrations, the newer States are entitled to more credit than they are often given for their actual achievements within the United Nations. Without their assistance it would, in fact, have been impossible in the grave crisis that followed the death of Mr. Hammarskjold, to defeat the Soviet attempt to put an end to all independent executive action by the United Nations and to secure at least for the time being the appointment of an acting Secretary-General with no diminution of his authority. Left to themselves, the great powers of East and West could not have resolved this deadlock. The continuance of an independent, responsible Secretariat was made possible because the great majority of the United Nations, including virtually all the new Asian and African States, would not go along with "an emasculated organization." And even on the specific issue of colonialism, as many commentators have pointed out, no charge of universal irresponsibility can properly be laid against the new States. More often than not in the last twelve months when colonial issues have arisen — in the debates, for example, on the resolution calling for a rapid end to colonialism, on the proposal to expel South Africa from the organization, on Cuba's earlier charges against the United States, on the virtual Soviet demand for out-and out-war against Katanga — on all these questions, the votes and influence of the majority of the new States were thrown against extreme proposals coming from the Soviet bloc or elsewhere and in favour of the more moderate resolutions which were invariably and overwhelmingly adopted.

In the light of this over-all record of the newly independent States within the United Nations, we are perhaps entitled to regard the immoderate attitudes and actions into which on occasion their anti-colonialism has led them, as transient phenomena likely to end with the liquidation of Western colonialism and with the increasing experience and maturity of the new states themselves. The process will take time but it will not necessarily be prolonged and the outcome seems certain. It may well emerge in a better

United Nations than one dominated and deadlocked by the unqualified conflict of the great powers.

Less predictable, perhaps, is the outcome of the controversy that has arisen, not least in my own country, over United Nations' actions in the Congo and the implicit question of the peace-keeping role of the organization in the future. Here I am not concerned, of course, with the extreme dissent of a Soviet Government which found its own freedom of action severely curtailed by United Nations' intervention in the Congo nor with the more sophisticated and subtle opposition of groups, in Britain and in Belgium in particular, fearful of the effects of United Nations policies on their economic and financial interests in the Congo. My concern is rather with the questions raised by avowed friends of the United Nations broadly in agreement with its necessary interventions in the Congo situation. These reflect serious doubts as to aspects of United Nations policy and action in the Congo and fears, in particular, of the organization being involved in this and similar situations maybe in the future, beyond its available power and authority.

These again are legitimate apprehensions and they have to be taken seriously. They were felt most acutely and properly at the time of the open clash between the United Nations forces and the Katanganese army, in and around Elizabethville, in September, 1961. They have been renewed and reinforced from time to time when it has seemed that the United Nations' forces were being drawn despite resolutions to the contrary, beyond the responsibility of restoring public order and preventing civil war, into the implicit, if not explicit, task of imposing a political settlement in the dispute between the Central Congolese Government and the Katanga provincial administration. It is not necessary to reject on pacifist grounds all use of force by the United Nations to believe that making war for the sake of peace is an expedient to be used only in the last resort — particularly by the United Nations. Admittedly, too, the problem of drawing the line between the exercise of a police function and the imposition of a given political settlement has been needlessly complicated by the confusing instructions at times issued to its representatives in the field by the Security Council and by the scarcely-disguised desire of some of its members to have the United Nations impose a given political solution without more ado. All this is simply an acknowledgement of the fact

that in a situation unique for the United Nations, the action of the organization has been inevitably experimental and not without its misjudgments and mistakes.

Even so, who would doubt that given the nature of the Congo crisis in the summer of 1960 it was providential that the United Nations was at hand to step into the situation? And who would doubt that broadly its intervention has been helpful and effective? It is true that there is still some considerable way to go before the aims of the United Nations in the Congo are fully achieved. Certainly much more has to be done before the Congo becomes effectively independent in political and economic terms. But much also has been achieved towards stabilising the internal situation. Congolese statesmen are progressively taking charge of their own affairs, and a large program of internationally-sponsored technical training and assistance is in operation. Given reasonable good fortune the Congo will, in time, achieve a genuine independence and become a going economic and political concern.

In any case, however partial the achievements to date of the United Nations in the Congo may be, we cannot exaggerate the importance of having available some means whereby the world community can "intervene in the name of non-intervention," in situations where the collapse of one system of power and the weakness of the new incumbent makes the rival interventions of other parties only too easy and perilous. The points of dissolving power are after all among the danger-points of our world today and it is precisely there — at those points — that the contribution of the United Nations is irreplaceable and indispensable. No less indispensable, we can now say in the light of recent events, is its role in "defusing" explosive situations between the great powers themselves and making possible the pursuance of negotiated settlements.

All this seems to me to make abundantly clear that it is a prime duty and interest of the Governments and peoples of the West and notably of your country and mine, to make energetic support of the United Nations a cardinal aim of international policy. To suggest this is not to propose the abandonment or the disregard of other aims and loyalties in the international field whether it is the integrated Western Europe or the Atlantic Community or American hemispheric collaboration or anything else. These are, or ought to be, complementary aims — each to the other and both to the United Nations — safeguarded, in the case

of the regional organizations, against their divisive implications by being developed within the wider framework of a universal co-operation. Nor, of course, is it to urge or expect the Governments of the West, or ourselves, to suspend all critical judgment where the actions of the United Nations are concerned. It is, rather, to acknowledge that the supreme interest of the Western powers is to strengthen the United Nations so as to enable it progressively to take up on behalf of the international community, the strain of the new crises inevitably going to be placed on the world organization in a period of rapid historical change. And it is to recognise that it is not least the interest and duty of the Western nations to be unmistakably on the side of the United Nations because the whole concept of an all-embracing organization — "the property of all but mastered by none" — and serving the unideological interest of the common man everywhere, is still basically under challenge from the Communist world.

This involves much more from our governments — or again from ourselves as individuals — than a benevolent neutrality towards the United Nations. It is not enough for the Western great powers — the one-time masters of the United Nations — to sit on the side-walk, as it were, nursing their hurt pride, lamenting their lost dominance and saying "Ah! well — the Club is not what it was." If their lofty declarations of fidelity to the United Nations are to mean anything they have to develop a dynamic policy towards the organization directed alike to remedying its weaknesses and utilising more fully its assets and possibilities. They have the obligation to clear their minds as to the executive functions they desire the United Nations to perform — to determine how much "operational capacity" they are prepared to see it develop — and having reached these decisions, to put their power and authority behind its effective action in a given situation without equivocation and delay. As far as remedying the weaknesses of the United Nations is concerned I would say two things: first to repeat that, as regards the weaknesses due to the immaturity and inexperience of the newer states, time can be expected to put that right. Second, I would suggest that a dynamic policy towards the United Nations would also require Western governments to be less apathetic than they have been towards the obvious anomalies in the United Nations today and the fact that little or no attempt has yet been made to adapt the *status quo* at the United Nations itself to the new balance of power. This is not, of course,

to suggest the Charter revision which is excluded by the impossibility of securing great power agreement. But it is to suggest that something might be done — short of treaty-made, structural adjustments — to bring the make-up of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the rest more into harmony with the facts of international life and more representative of a United Nations which has doubled its membership and in many ways transformed its character since 1945.

As for utilising more fully the assets and possibilities of the United Nations, this leads me to say a few words finally about the evolution of the organization and the nature of the responsibilities it can and should undertake in the future. Here I am still thinking particularly about the attitude and responsibilities of the Western Governments or the Western great powers. Broadly as it seems to me, they have to be with Dag Hammarskjold in his rejection of a purely conservative — even minimal — estimate of the future role of the organization. They must envisage the United Nations as he did, not as "a static machinery" but as a growing organism, an evolving institution, developing slowly but surely something of a supranational status and authority, "a dynamic instrument of governments" expressing itself in forms of executive action and permeated in all its dealings and especially in the demeanour of its Secretariat with a spirit of objectivity in harmony with the principles laid down in the Charter. And I imagine that most of us here would favour this concept, too, if only because it at least makes possible the progressive building-up of the framework of world order or world government which has become essential in the nuclear age if our world is to survive.

Granted the validity of such a concept, it is still legitimate to ask, without depreciation of Hammarskjold's immense service to the United Nations, whether, in fact, his use of the United Nations in the Congo — imposed upon him largely though it was by the circumstances themselves — did not dangerously overstrain the capacities of the organization and incidentally involve an over-concentration of power in one person and in one place. Certainly for the future the Western Governments have the duty to recognise and urge others to recognise, that even a United Nations accepting the role — to quote U Thant — of "agent and moderator of historic change," has to fulfill that task within existing limitations and that to try and take its executive

action too fast and too far may be to imperil its existence altogether as an all-embracing organization. And one of the main limitations that has to be recognized is the obvious fact that the Communists are there, as well as the non-Communists and the non-aligned, and that all three must continue to be there if the organization is to mitigate the conflicts that divide our world and to stand in reserve at moments of crisis such as we have recently encountered. I have been at the United Nations on and off since 1950 and I know only too well the price the organization has had to pay in terms of frustrated action by the presence and the veto of the Communist bloc. Nobody knows precisely what their objectives are in the United Nations — they may not even know precisely themselves. They may intend or hope ultimately to supplant it with a Communist world organization. They may hope, that is, to capture it and even to kill it as the kind of organization both the Charter and Hammarskjold envisaged it to be. But in the meantime they have to operate in it as it is, like everyone else; and like quite a number of other states which have from time to time found themselves at odds with the United Nations, they have decided that it is inconceivable that they should leave it. They have just now, in fact, been obliged in regard to Cuba to acknowledge its value and utilize its services. A year ago, thanks, as I said earlier, to the attitude of the smaller countries, they were obliged to accept defeat on the question of the *troika* — the three-headed Secretary-General. They have been obliged, too, to realise that the smaller countries in the United Nations are sick to death of the cold war and of having their constructive aims and purposes constantly bedeviled by it.

It may therefore be true that the prospect of a somewhat more co-operative era in the United Nations is at hand. Certainly it seems clear to me that we have to make up our minds whether it is not better on balance to have the Communists — the U.S.S.R. in particular — in the organization. I do not have much doubt that it is. But if we are going to acknowledge that, then we have to acknowledge, too, that it cannot be a predominantly American United Nations or a predominantly British United Nations or even a predominantly Afro-Asian United Nations. There must be a willingness to give the Eastern bloc countries their appropriate strength in the Secretariat and their appropriate say in the councils of the organization. This is the price we pay for a universality which, I think, is indispensable. It is also the price we pay for the recognition,

which is forced upon us, that there is no prospect of the United Nations developing in the foreseeable future into a real and independent centre of power. Probably, it is true to say, the world becomes less rather than more adapted to a centralised global control. The United Nations, in other words, will remain by and large the centre for the harmonizing by pragmatic means of the activities of nations on the widest possible basis. This purpose will involve as much diplomacy as executive action and in this diplomacy the United Nations cannot and will not succeed unless it is at least in some measure a common instrument of East and West.

I would end therefore where I began, emphasizing a realistic approach to the United Nations, the need to recognize its limitations, to use it as it is and to base its development on pragmatic rather than visionary grounds. I began with a quotation from Adlai Stevenson; perhaps I may end with one. "This present U.N." he said, in the same article from which I quoted earlier, "is just about all the law and order our anarchic world will swallow today. If we are to advance to higher standards or greater security we must work on patiently from the spot we have already reached and not jettison our few working examples of genuine international action in favour of something more ideal — which we shall not get — or more innocuous, which will not meet our needs. What we have is man's first sketch of the world society he has to create. He can build better than this — so much is obvious. But will he go on building at all if we are forever tearing up the foundations? The experiment of living together as a single, human family is more likely to grow from precedent to precedent, by experience and daily work and set-backs and partial successes, than to spring utopian and fully-formed from the unimaginable collective agreement of world minds. Let us go on with what we have. Let us improve it whenever we can. Let us give it the imaginative and creative support which will allow its authority to grow and its peace-making capacities to be more fully realised."

Perhaps this is a peculiarly relevant moment to recall these words and to affirm their appeal.

Chapter 3

THE DEEPER CHALLENGES OF COMMUNISM

The objective appraisal of Communism which as Christians we are required to make must begin with a recognition of the validity, so to speak, of Communism — an acknowledgment of the things in Communism which would seem to be true, whether positively or negatively. First and foremost we can acknowledge as good the impulses and purposes of Communism insofar as these are directed to the elimination of social evils and in particular to the ending of poverty and exploitation. We can recognize what John C. Bennett calls "the significance of its claim to stand for a new order of justice and equality." We can recognize, too, the value of its emphasis on the group purpose as a proper reaction to a self-seeking and self-centred individualism. We can acknowledge and admire the single-mindness with which very often these purposes are pursued. We can recognize, too, at this level, and perhaps with some apprehension, the strength of its appeal to the so-called "backward" peoples and "backward" countries, if only as a technique for rapidly overcoming their timeless poverty and wretchedness.

Secondly, we have to acknowledge the positive achievements of Communism in the social, economic and technological advance of the Soviet Union since 1917, particularly in the last five to ten years and at least in the beginnings of a similar advance, since 1950, in mainland China. We might have to question Soviet estimates of the debt Russian progress owes to Communism, recalling that Russia's industrial revolution was in fact well under way in 1917. We certainly have to take into account the tremendous cost in human misery which both the Soviet and Communist China revolutions have involved, and judge for ourselves how far so terrible a price for progress has been morally justified. We can recall that Stalin, in the case of Soviet Russia, inflicted almost limitless physical suffering on the Russian people. We can recognize with Robert Guillain, the distinguished French journalist who knows Communist China well, that the progress made in China in the last twelve years has been achieved "at the cost of the substitution of mental poverty for physical poverty" and of what he calls "the death of the cultivation of the mind."

But even so, it has to be acknowledged that there have been real social and economic gains for the Soviet people which have given them rewards and satisfactions, not all

of them strictly economic, unheard of in the past. The social and economic gains of the revolution to date for the Chinese people, are much more difficult to estimate, if only because of the severe natural disasters they have had to meet in the last three or four years. There are some who would deny any gains at all. Certainly what has been gained in China has been achieved at the price of spiritual and political freedoms which we in the West regard, or profess to regard, as precious — though admittedly most Chinese in the past knew little about them anyway. But China is effectively unified for the first time in generations. There is no overt civil war. There are no rampaging warlords. The administration at all levels is surprisingly honest. Corruption has largely disappeared and gone, too, to quote Guillain again, are "the smells, the squalor, the rags, the beggars and the dirt." Economic standards are still desperately low according to Western criteria, but there is a measure of price stability and the significance of this last, of the victory over inflation, can scarcely be exaggerated in view of the experience of the Chinese. There is no question moreover that the present government in China has the people fully behind it in one of its major purposes, which is to check "the decay of empire," to put an end to what is called the national humiliation of one hundred years of domination and penetration by foreign powers, and to establish an unquestionably independent, sovereign and great China.

Thirdly we can acknowledge that, whatever may be the errors in Communism, "the lie in Communism," to use Berdyaev's phrase, there is a truth or at least a half-truth in the basic theories of Communism in their stress on the significance of economic or material factors in the human situation. If it is true, as we here believe it is, that man does not live by bread alone, it is no less true that he cannot live without it. To quote John C. Bennett again: "Without a minimal economic security, all else — his art, his philosophy, his music, his politics, even his religion becomes impossible." And that, of course, is incidentally a basic Christian premise also. We do not deny as Christians the existence and importance of the material. On the contrary, perhaps the supreme message of Christianity is that the material and spiritual are one and indivisible and that the only fatal thing is to try to divide them. We can acknowledge, in other words, that whatever its limitations, the economic or materialistic interpretation of history which is the basis of Marxism has served and served usefully to

correct purely idealized conceptions of life and of religion which have failed to recognize this unity of the material and the spiritual.

Fourthly and lastly, in the realm of acknowledgments, we can recognize the validity of much of the Communist indictment of the professedly Christian and democratic West in its failure to live up to its own ideas and ideals of freedom and fraternity. To this, I shall return before I end, contenting myself here with saying that, if Berdyaev's remark that Communism is "a poison born out of the shortcomings of Christians," is true in the literal and historical sense, in terms, that is, of the mid-nineteenth century origins and inspirations of Marxism, it is still only too true unfortunately in terms of much of the contemporary world, in terms of the challenges of Communism to our own faithlessness and our own weaknesses today. "The new Communist world," as an ex-China missionary has written, "is a judgment on our old world."

These acknowledgments require the Christian to be humble and constructive in his approach to Communism. But they do not entitle him to ignore or underestimate the issues that separate Communism from Christianity or that separate for that matter the Communist systems and ways of life, or to disguise from himself and others that at vital points they are in profound conflict with each other. It is necessary, of course, to avoid the easy hypocrisy which compares Communist *practice* with Christian *theory,* with Christian ideals which are never realized or even seriously attempted. But if there is a truth and a lie in Communism, we must recognize and acknowledge the lie as frankly as we accept the truth. We have not to be so filled with tolerance and sentimentality that we cannot distinguish good from evil, or if you like, relative "goods" from each other. For if we are so obsessed with self-criticism as to be incapable of perceiving the essential errors of Communism, we betray our Christian duty for one thing, and for another we disqualify ourselves for promoting whatever possibilities there are of an ultimate synthesis which takes and makes the best of both worlds.

What then is the lie in Communism, judged not in abstract terms but in terms of the nature of the system and its essential defects and disabilities as seen from a Christian and Western democratic standpoint — if I may put these things together without pretending to equate them? I am not myself inclined to establish the difference

between Christianity and Communism on the acknowledged atheism of Communism. True, the fundamental error of the central philosophies of Communism is that they leave out God. True, too, that this is not simply a theoretical idolatry with no practical consequences. But there is so much practical idolatry, too, in the societies of the West, so much practical atheism, so much effectual and consistent denial of God by those who profess to acknowledge him, including ourselves, that I would hesitate to characterize this as the decisive frontier between the Communists and ourselves. I remember a striking broadcast by Karl Barth in the early stages of the Second World War in which he said: "Never forget that the godlessness that crucified Christ was not the theoretical godlessness of the atheist but the practical godlessness of the pious." Nor would I find it easy to establish the distinction between the two systems in the rejection by Communism of absolute values. Unfortunately the expediency that subordinates means to ends is not an exclusive Communist phenomenon, as the history of religious persecution shows. And even today countries professing to accept and respect Christian values are prepared, however reluctantly, to inflict on the peoples of other countries the unspeakable horrors of thermonuclear war. As long, therefore, as Christians are ready, with Communists, to justify any measures necessary to ensure victory or avoid defeat in war or in revolution, the exclusive claim to absolute moral standards is difficult to sustain.

There are in my own country, and maybe here too, those who, facing these facts, would go so far as to say that there is little or nothing to choose between ourselves and the Communists in the matter of the commission of evil deeds. All the barbarities of the Communists, they would say, can be matched by the barbarities of the darkest periods of early British capitalism and colonialism — of our Industrial Revolution and empire-building. And again are we not, they say, alike in both East and West in our willingness to commit actions, in the last resort, unprecedented in their barbarism and violence? However exact or inexact these parallels may be, it is useful to have our consciences stirred, our tendency to self-righteousness disturbed in this way. But those who make this point are not entitled to overlook the very distinction which enables them not only to challenge our self-righteousness, but to protest against the evils committed or proposed to be committed in our name. In the darkest period of the Industrial

Revolution in Britain, voices were raised in determined protest against its social consequences. Men and women laboured devotedly to correct its more flagrant evils. They roused the public and the private conscience, as indeed did Karl Marx himself writing his Communist Manifesto in 1848 in the British Museum. In 1962 other men and women in my country march from Aldermaston or sit down in Trafalgar Square, or in this country engage in a vigil outside the White House or the United Nations — all of them in order to protest against the barbarities implicit in nuclear war and nuclear war preparation. It was Frenchmen, as has been pointed out, who denounced what Frenchmen did in Algeria; it was Americans who put a stop to McCarthy; it was Englishmen who brought the Black and Tan atrocities in Ireland to an end; and to come nearer to our own time, it was Englishmen who reversed or helped to reverse our aberration over Suez in 1956.

These protests are made today as they were made ten, forty or one hundred years ago within the framework of a political system that allows for criticism, disagreement and dissent, within a society where the public, and private conscience, are allowed to exist. That they are not permitted, as yet, to exist under Communism — one only dissents from or repudiates the excesses of Stalinism when it is safe and expedient to do so — is, I suggest, the crux of the difference between a Communist society and a free society, and an index perhaps of "the root malignancy" in Communism. For the essence of the free society, and its safeguard, is in the recognition that there are rights — essentially of a moral character — belonging to the human person that are not to be abrogated or over-ruled by claims of state. It is this that makes the free society, as distinguishable from the conscience-rejecting system of totalitarian Communism, indispensable to the Christian. Because without the recognition of conscience — as John Middleton Murry wrote: "there can be no assurance of justice, of legality, of toleration or even of decency; there can be no adequate safeguards against despotism, no moral as distinct from political protest against anything and ultimately no freedom of the human spirit."

Having said this I would cautiously add that while this is still the vital difference between the societies of East and West, the gap between them — at least the gap between the Soviet Union and the West — is slowly but perceptibly narrowing. I am not here thinking pri-

marily of the fact that thanks to the rapidly increasing industrialisation of the Soviet Union, the development there of a bourgeois technocracy and the emergence of an educated elite for whom the October Revolution is hearsay and not actual experience, there is an ever-increasing approximation, in economic aims and structures if not in social purpose, between the Soviet Union and the United States. I have in mind rather the fact that the demand for greater freedom in moral and spiritual terms, for a respite from the permanent revolution and its pressures, is growing in the Soviet Union and at least in a measure, obliging its rulers to relax their grip on the Soviet people. The extent of the relaxation has not to be exaggerated. "The Soviet Union has not yet abandoned," to quote a symbolic phrase of Raymond Aron's, "the fight against heretics." It may still be quite a long way from doing so and a reaction is still possible in the meantime. But at least a beginning has been made and the first visible steps towards a greater tolerance taken. Given the absence of acute international crisis and a growing intercourse at all levels between the peoples of the West and the peoples of Russia, the process seems likely to continue and to develop. It may be pertinent to remind ourselves that after all the Russians and the Chinese are broadly after the same things as ourselves. For them, as for us, the declared goals are social equality, the transcendence of class divisions, the abolition of poverty and insecurity, and "the emergence of the whole community into the foreground of political action" — in short, real democracy. It could be that beneath the many and the real divergencies and the bitter conflicts of our time, East and West are moving slowly toward the same ends and a similar society — a better society than we yet know in either East or West.

My final observation would relate then to the responsibility of Western societies and especially to that of the Christian individual within them, in face of the Communist challenge. It is to say that, of course, we do not defend our essential Western values against the challenge of Communism by destroying them either in a military or a non-military conflict with Communism. We cannot win in the moral encounter with Communism by giving it the victory in our own hearts — by approximating, that is, Western aims and methods to Communist aims and Communist methods. We win, if at all, in the non-military encounter with Communism by concentrating not so much on the errors and the evils of Communism as on the de-

ficiencies and failures of the Western world. We turn our scrutiny from the Communists to ourselves, recognizing that we in the West are not quite as moral as we sometimes claim to be nor the Communists quite as immoral as we sometimes think they are. Above all we try to fill the vacuum of faith with a renewed faith of our own. Only too often we seem to be trying to meet the poison in Communism by absorbing it into our own systems, by practising in our own countries and communities the very evils we denounce in it. If in the proposed defence of prized liberties against the assaults of Communism, we destroy or curtail our own freedom of opinion, our own right to speak and to differ freely like free men, we are well on the way, in any case, to losing out to Communism. Or if all we seem concerned about in the West is out-bidding, out-rivalling Communism in a practical materialism, in creating a paradise of consumer goods, we are doomed and defeated even before we start; because as Barbara Ward has pointed out, the materialism (namely Communism) that believes in itself is bound to win out against a materialism like ours that is apologetic and shame-faced knowing itself to be denying the very essence of the values for which it professes to stand. "The trial of soul we face today," said this same writer recently, "is to out-dream the Communist visionaries, out-work the Communist fanatics and out-dare the voices of defeatism and discouragement within our own society. This is precisely the challenge which Western man again and again in his millennial record, has met and measured and triumphantly overcome." Let us hope she is right.

Chapter 4

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE — HOPE OR DELUSION?

I want to discuss with you this evening what we commonly call the East-West problem in its more immediate aspects, and to do this on the basis of an objective examination of the meaning and the potentialities of what we have come to know as "peaceful coexistence." Merely to undertake this examination is judged unfriendly by the Communists. The concept of peaceful coexistence has no ambiguities for them and anyone who wants to probe into its meaning, even if only to understand it better must, as they see it, be wanting to maintain "the cold war" and to discourage the prospect of a new era of peace.

Even so, we must not be deterred. After all, it is the Communists themselves who are not only vigorously promoting the idea of peaceful coexistence but also carefully prescribing its limits and possibilities. Those to whom it is offered as a specific for peaceful relations between East and West, are not only entitled but required to know what it really means or the ultimate confusion and danger may be worse than the first. How much or how little "peace" does it entail? Does it mean that if military force is now a vacuum, the vacuum is to be filled with war of another kind? Is the Soviet Union simply offering the West substitutes for war aimed, in Max Ascoli's phrase, "at the ending of coexistence in its favour?" Or is it an invitation to a genuinely peaceful competition in well-being — the well-being not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the West but of others as well? Does it offer, that is to say, a basis for a new and constructive relationship between East and West? And, last but not least, if it is to provide such a basis, what does it require not only from the East but from the West in turn?

We shall be in a better position, perhaps, to answer these questions if we first define our terms and, in particular, if we try to see what peaceful coexistence means to the Communists themselves. After all both the concept and the phrase itself are Communist in origin and inspiration. What does the concept then imply to them? The answer can be given in summary form in this way.

Future history, according to Marxist theory, is already determined. The world moves inexorably to a certain goal, which is the downfall of capitalism and the universalisation of the Communist system. But Rome was not built in a

day. The process will take time; the interim may well be prolonged. And in the interim the two contrasting and conflicting systems, Communist and Capitalist, will exist simultaneously; that is to say they will co-exist. Sooner or later, said Lenin and Stalin, there is a strong possibility, if not probability, of military conflict between them. (Mr. Khrushchev, appreciating the calamitous implications of contemporary war, has abandoned the assumption of inevitable military conflict — to which revision of the doctrine we shall return in a moment). But, the argument continues, the Soviet State and the capitalist powers cannot merely disengage themselves militarily; they must have some sort of positive relations with each other, particularly in a shrinking world, and relations that are as peaceful as may be. They should develop, therefore, on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other's countries and in a spirit of mutual understanding, as much interchange as possible in the trade and cultural fields. This, in generalised terms, is the theory of peaceful co-existence as enunciated by the Communists themselves.

But, even so, this is not in the Communist view a policy for all time. Whether war is or is not an inevitable element in the process, peaceful co-existence remains a strictly provisional concept. It involves no abandonment, no modification even, of the ultimate aim which is the total and final vindication and triumph of Communism. On the contrary, not the least of the justifications for peaceful co-existence in Communist eyes, is that it makes the realisation of the ultimate aim less risky, and more certain. As the declaration of the eighty-one Communist Parties after their Moscow meeting of December, 1960, expressed it: "Peaceful co-existence of countries with differing social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggles of the working class, of all the Communist parties for the triumph of Socialist ideas." In short, peaceful co-existence is a means to an end, not an end in itself, and the ends it is destined to serve remain unequivocally and uncompromisingly Communist.

How much peace is there, then, in peaceful co-existence so defined? Before suggesting an answer to the question let me follow up for a moment the implications of Mr. Khrushchev's revision of the doctrine, since this raises the important differences that have developed on these issues within the so-called "camp of Socialism" itself — between

in particular the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Here again it must be emphasised, it is not the formal ends of Communism that are in dispute; the differences relate not so much to ends as to means — the methods to be used in the building of Communism and above all to the timing of the various phases of the process and the speed at which they can be fulfilled. And the dispute has many facets. It concerns, where it is a question of the progress towards full Communism of a country already under Communist rule, the domestic revolutionary strategy of Communism. Where relations with the uncommitted world, the emerging countries of Asia and Africa, are involved, the question is how best to further revolutionary situations likely to serve ultimate Communist ends in countries that have newly achieved their political independence or are on the verge of doing so. The dispute also concerns the question of authority within the Communist world — the contest for leadership of the Communist bloc itself. Where is the Communist papacy, the Communist Vatican, to be located? As Edward Crankshaw once put it: "can you have a Communist Byzantium as well as a Communist Rome?"

But above all, the differences between Moscow and Peking in these matters relate to the global strategy of Communism and its attitude to the non-Communist great powers of the West. Since, for both Lenin and Stalin, as we have already noted, a violent struggle between the Soviet Union and the capitalist powers of the West seemed virtually inevitable in the longer run, the purpose of peaceful coexistence for them was to gain time to ensure, if possible, that the war would be fought under conditions of maximum advantage to the Communist side. Mr. Khrushchev in his revision of the doctrine has not, of course, turned to Quaker pacifism. He has not rejected "wars of national liberation," that is to say, wars fought by dependent peoples to gain independence (unless, of course, the peoples happen to be dependent on the Communists themselves). Nor of course has he rejected the legitimacy of revolution. But, recognising the all-embracing destructiveness of modern warfare and assuming, too, the decline of imperialism so-called and the growing strength of the Socialist camp — a decisive shift, as he sees it, in the world balance of power — he insists or has insisted to date that military war between the Communist great powers and the West must be avoided and that the struggle between them must be waged by other means. In the article which

he contributed to *Foreign Affairs* about the time of his American visit three years ago, he asked: "What then is the policy of peaceful coexistence? In its simplest expression," he replied, answering his own question, "it signifies the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues." And to this thesis he has given dramatic confirmation in his withdrawal over Cuba.

This re-writing of Lenin's and Stalin's teaching on war and peace and the correct attitude for Communism to adopt towards the "imperialist" powers of the West, is unacceptable to the People's Republic of China; in fact it has been constantly and bitterly attacked by Peking. The Chinese Communist leaders pay lip-service to peaceful coexistence if only to give the appearance of unity with the Russians on this as on other issues; but they are, in fact, much more pessimistic than the Russians about making the transition to Communism peacefully, whether within a given country or in the world at large. They will admit that the emergence of a powerful Socialist system has weakened the power of imperialism so-called but the imperialists, to quote a not very felicitous phrase from the Chinese military journal *Red Flag*, "have not laid down the butcher's knife or abandoned aggression." The Chinese will admit, too, that if global nuclear war should break out great sacrifices would be imposed on all the peoples, but as they see it, it would be imperialism and not mankind in general that would be annihilated. And then as another Chinese paper put it: "the victorious peoples" (that is, one supposes, the Chinese or the Communists in general) "will build a beautiful future for themselves on the debris of a dead imperialism." The Chinese will agree, further, with the Soviet view that thanks to Soviet advances in weapon development, the balance of power has moved to the advantage of the East against the West. But all this in their view provides the opportunity and the justification, not for a relaxing of the Communist attitude to the outside world, but for driving the advantage home, for a more militant and revolutionary worldwide Communist posture, not least in the under-developed regions of the world.

By and large, these differences in the Chinese and Soviet attitudes reflect the relative stages of the two Communist revolutions. The Soviet revolution is forty-five years old; the Soviet Union has reached economic maturity, to use the current jargon, or is rapidly doing so. It is de-

termined to preserve its achievements to date from the total destruction of nuclear war. It can even do with a period of relaxed international tension, or relative peace — at least so that the gains of the revolution can be consolidated and the practical benefits of economic maturity be extended more widely to the Russian people. The U.S.S.R. has everything to gain from a switch to economic as against military competition with the West. Its policy, therefore, in international affairs, in the political struggle between East and West, is broadly still one of consolidation. (There is little doubt, I think, that Mr. Khrushchev's over-riding purpose in Central Europe is to stabilize the *status quo,* and his insistence on rectifying the particular anomaly that is Berlin only underlines this general purpose of tidying up and confirming the existing situation in Middle Europe.)

The Chinese revolution, on the other hand, is only thirteen years old. It is at what is called the stage of "take-off" in economic development; it is moving into its Stalin era rather than out of it, like the U.S.S.R. The Chinese leaders are trying to modernise China in a generation and for this purpose they need all the external tension there is, or that can be created, to provide the stimulus necessary to maintain the drive forward and to obtain the necessary sacrifices from their people. They can scarcely afford a period of international tranquillity because their hold on the Chinese masses depends on convincing them that they are constantly engaged in a ruthless struggle for survival against dangerous forces. The major outside enemy — American "aggressive imperialism" — must be depicted much bigger than life-size; the image of a hostile, imperialist world must be maintained. And it must be admitted that the People's Republic of China, at least in its own estimation, is a dissatisfied power. It is deprived, as it believes, of its rightful ownership of Formosa (Taiwan) and of its rightful title to China's place in the United Nations. Furthermore the massive obstacle, clearly, to the achievement of these political aims is the United States. No peaceful coexistence for the Chinese, therefore, if it is to involve any easing-off in the domestic or the international struggle.

So much for the Chinese end, as it were, of the problem. What are we to say of Western responsibilities in regard to the Soviet Union and Soviet ideas of coexistence and co-operation? It has to be said at once that even Mr. Khrushchev's definition of peaceful coexistence as simply

the continuation of political and ideological struggle without recourse to military war, can hardly be expected to raise any great enthusiasm in the Western world. It is possible to welcome the emphasis on the need to eliminate war as a means of resolving East-West differences without believing that peaceful coexistence even in the current and preferred Soviet definition, provides a sufficient basis for a positive co-operation between East and West or promises anything in the way of genuine peace.

The underlying assumptions of peaceful coexistence as understood by the Communists are in any case unacceptable to all but Communists in the West — or perhaps I ought to say, more cautiously, to all but Communists in Great Britain. By and large we — the British — do not believe that the social systems of the world can be divided and neatly docketed into two types, and two types only, described as socialist and capitalist. We do not see this as corresponding even to the realities of the situation as it is and much less to the situation as we hope and expect it to become. What resemblance has capitalism today to the laissez-faire of the Victorians — even, dare I say, capitalism in the United States? On the other side the very disputes within the Communist world make clear that even Communists no longer know for sure, or can agree among themselves, as to what Communism is. Certainly we can say that neither animal is what it was. Nor, of course, do we believe in Britain or the United States that sooner or later one system — that is the Communist system — must necessarily triumph totally over the other system or over all other systems if there are more than two. Many of us would not even want to assert, I imagine, that the Western system — what we call free democracy — must necessarily triumph in its present form over Communism as we know it today. We would prefer to regard both Soviet and Western societies as, in some degree, evolving societies with constantly changing patterns making possible perhaps ultimately, in a new synthesis, a society that makes the best of both worlds and fashions it into something better than we can yet see in East or West.

But even if we admit, as I think we must, that the Communists are right in insisting that the ideological struggle or the conflict of ideas is inescapable and will continue — that, to quote Arnold Toynbee, "the competitive propaganda of our ideas and ideals must go on"—we can still insist that it is all-important to know under what conditions

the struggle is waged. For unless the struggle is fought out on reasonably fair and equal terms, it must in fact negate peace and even peaceful coexistence. It is one thing to have a straight competition between ways of attaining ideals and around the merits of the one or other social system — let the best side win — which is the Communists' declared desire. That suits us quite well; it is a very English approach. But it is quite another thing if the peoples on one side have free access to both sets of ideas while the peoples on the other have no such freedom at all. The dialogue, that is to say, can scarcely be effective in a world of the jamming of foreign broadcasts, of restrictions on access to newspapers and books and information in general, and of officially-limited opportunities of personal contact between peoples. It is another thing, too, if the straight competition of ideas and of social philosophies is supplemented and supported not, necessarily, by palpable aggression or interference but by more subtle methods of infiltration and penetration.

Clearly too any peaceful coexistence worth the name is not compatible, as we have recently seen, with the placing of offensive Soviet missile sites in Cuba — virtually in the American heartland — since that brought us to the edge of war. It clearly is not compatible with Communist-inspired violent sabotage of one sixth of the oil production of Venezuela. But at less spectacular levels, it is not compatible with the Communist-inspired promotion of industrial unrest in Western countries in support of extreme economic demands which must have the effect of disrupting or gravely damaging the economic life of the community. It is not compatible moreover with a constant Soviet denigration of Western countries, a consistent distortion of their aims and policies and a cynical unwillingness even to try to comprehend the significance of their liberal values and institutions.

A coexistence, then, that has any right to be called peaceful, cannot be reconciled with any of these things. Indeed if Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues cannot come up with a better, more positive and less ambiguous definition of "peaceful coexistence" than this, it is difficult to see how the ideological struggle can be carried on peacefully and, above all, how, in the face of the Soviet challenge — the challenge of a revolutionary ideology linked with massive State power — enough confidence can be engendered between East and West to make any solid, mutual

accord possible. There is no reason, after all, why the Western world, whatever its desires and need for peaceful accommodations with the Communist states may be, should be interested in a coexistence which is a mere strategy of the Communist revolution — a temporary phenomenon, that is, pending the universal victory of Communism. But there is every reason, on the other hand, why the West should eagerly welcome and actively promote a genuinely peaceful coexistence — even competitive one — promising an evolving and, one hopes, improving relationship between the two sides.

What hopes are there, you may well ask, of the Communists — and I am thinking here of the Soviet Communists primarily — changing their spots in this way and abiding by the conventions of a manifestly peaceful coexistence with or without formal rules? The hopes must certainly not be exaggerated. Habits change slowly in East or West, and in any case the continuing influence of Marxist dogma and doctrine on Soviet policies and attitudes and actions, is still not to be under-rated or despised. But even so in the logic of events, in the pragmatism of history as it is called, the trends I think — despite the unsolved political tensions and the recurring crises — are in fact, all in the direction of a more normal, more civilised and more co-operative relationship between at least the Russians and the West and much has already been achieved in this direction. "Evidence of ideological apathy," as someone has said, "accumulates on both sides of the Iron Curtain." Already the pressures of an enforced conformity on the Russian people — enforced that is by their own rulers — have been sensibly relaxed though by no means removed altogether. Already too, there has been a very considerable increase over the last five years in cultural contacts, in personal intercourse at all levels between the Soviet peoples and the peoples of the West, not least between the peoples of the United States and Great Britain. Given the absence of acute international crisis, there is every expectation that these phenomena will continue and that the processes both of normalising the life of the Soviet people and of improving the Soviet's external relations with the Western world, will go on.

So far, I have been talking about Soviet responsibility for making peaceful coexistence work — for making it acceptable to and usable by the West in the interests of a genuine move towards peace. But, of course, a peaceful

coexistence which is to serve a genuinely peaceful purpose is a two-way affair, not simply a responsibility of the Communists themselves. It demands certain attitudes and calls for certain responsibilities from the Western world as well. If we in the Western world believe at all in the possibility and the necessity of some kind of accommodation between East and West (which I would say is indispensable if we are to avoid the ultimate disaster of thermonuclear war, or to avoid constantly coming to the brink of it), then we, too, no less than the Communists will be required to do something more than avoid military war with the other side. We shall in fact have to abandon, as the Communists will have to abandon, the policy of all possible hostility short of military conflict. If we want a peaceful coexistence worthy of the name between East and West, we must recognise that some things and some actions on our part are compatible with that purpose and some not. Admittedly again the difficulties of drawing the line between what is permissible and what is not are considerable, though the attempt has to be made. Entering a sensitive area of discussion for me here — for a foreign visitor on American soil — I turn for a moment to illustrate the point by reference to policies towards Cuba, making two observations on this matter. First, it is certainly compatible with peaceful coexistence that the West, and the United States in particular, should do its best to ensure that there are no more Cubas in the American hemisphere — that the infection of Communism does not spread to the mainland of Latin America, though I am convinced that ultimately the only effective way to do that is so to raise the economic and social standards of the Latin American Republics so as to make them immune to the penetrative power of Communism. Of course, I would recognise also that the United States and the Organization of American States as a whole, must ensure and continue to ensure that Cuba is not established as a palpable military threat to the security of the United States and its neighbours to the South, and that this has to be embraced by any ideas of peaceful coexistence that are to be acceptable to the Western world.

But in the second place it has to be said, I think, that anything like a genuine peaceful coexistence may require of the West, and the United States in particular, not only the rejection of a forcible military attempt to destroy Communism in Cuba, but a virtual acceptance for the time being of the *status quo* in Cuba and a return progressively

to something like normal diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba, not least on the supposition that this may well be the best way to lessen the Soviet hold over Cuba and to win ultimately the politico-ideological struggle with Soviet Communism in a vital area of the world. These are very difficult and controversial questions I well know, and perhaps, as far as American policy is involved in them, outside my competence anyway. But what is unanswerable, I think, is that if we want, or believe to be necessary, something more than an armed truce between East and West— if we are to be consistent and honest in demanding from the Soviet Union an improved version of their idea of peaceful coexistence — we must recognise that this requires certain renunciations from us too, and certain positive obligations as well.

The stress in what I have been saying up to this point has been on what might be called the negative conditions of a mutually acceptable peaceful coexistence — on the things each side must eschew if a reasonable peaceful and honourable relationship is to be established between East and West, or at least between the Soviet Union and the West. I would want to go beyond that so as to hint, at least, at a more positive approach to the problems in the hope that it may not be impossible to develop peaceful coexistence in time into something like an active co-operation between the two sides. Recognising what your former Secretary of State, Christian Herter, once called the fact of "shared interest in the essentials of human welfare and everyday life," we should seize every valid opportunity of expanding the area of co-operation with the Soviet Union or of turning competition into co-operation, as in the International Geophysical Year or the development of Antarctica or in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy or in the handling of the problems of outer space and in numerous other potential fields. It may be that the economic field offers hopeful possibilities of developing and normalising Soviet - Western relations, especially through the expansion of East-West trade. Perhaps the most encouraging development of all on the economic side would be an East-West co-operation in organising and expanding multilateral aid projects to underdeveloped countries through the United Nations or even by direct co-operations between the U.S.S.R. The U.S.A., and the West should go on indicating its readiness for that even though Mr. Khrushchev shows no sign at all at present of

a willingness to go so far in peaceful co-operation with the West.

On the side of cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the West there has already been a notable and encouraging development over the last few years, both in the more general field of tourist exchanges and in the proliferation of numerous special unofficial and semi-official Conferences such as the recent Soviet-American Conference held at Andover in this country — in which Russians and Westerners have the opportunity of rubbing shoulders with each other and of exchanging ideas and opinions with at least the beginnings of a greater show of flexibility and understanding.

None of this, it has to be said, will prevent the thermo-nuclear war coming if other circumstances are to make it inevitable. None of this give and take of peaceful contact and developing peaceful co-operation will indeed be possible if we have to endure a series of recurring crises such as the Cuban crisis, and if we still fail to make any tangible progress towards political agreements on the major issues dividing the two sides and notably in an initial step towards real and agreed disarmament.

No one expects spectacular or rapid progress towards these ends in any case, even in the aftermath of the respite recently secured. But at least the outcome of that fateful week may be that the task of negotiating East-West agreements is tackled with a new realism and with better prospects of success than at any time since the Second World War ended. I am sure we are more likely to succeed in these objectives if, in both East and West, we have thought out more clearly these problems of peaceful coexistence which I have been discussing, and have faced up frankly to the central question: how much peace between East and West do we want — or must we have — and what price are we prepared and not prepared to pay for it?

Gerald Bailey
M.A. University of Cambridge, England.

Parliamentary Candidate for Hampshire constituencies at the General Elections of 1929 and 1935. Director of the National Peace Council from 1930 to 1949. Secretary and later Vice-Chairman of the Friends East-West Relations Committee (London) from 1951 - 1962. Chairman of the General Purposes Committee of the Great Britain - U.S.S.R. Association (1961 -). Member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs from 1931 to present time. Member of the National Executive of the United Nations Association of Great Britain. Quaker observer at seven General Assemblies of the United Nations between 1950 and 1962. Member of Quaker delegations to the U.S.S.R. (1951), Communist China (1955), Poland (1958). Member of Great Britain-U.S.S.R. Association's delegation to the Soviet Union (1960). Participant in the Anglo-Soviet Conference at Wiston House (England) in 1961, the Konigswinter (Anglo-German Fellowship) Conference (1961); the Selsdon Park Conference of American, Polish, British and Russian Journalists (1962), and at numerous Conferences for Diplomats held at Clarens, Switzerland, between 1951 and 1961. Has lectured and broadcast in Britain, the U.S.A., France, Germany, Switzerland and other European countries.